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1Reproductive Genetics: From Choice to Ambivalence and Back Again
Anne Kerr
Introduction
Setting the scene
Genetics, genomics and society has burgeoned as an area of social and cultural
scholarship alongside new technologies of diagnostics, databanking, treatment and
genetic modification. In the late 1990s, as the Human Genome Project produced ever
more detailed draft maps, and genes for the most common single gene disorders were
identified and linked to the range of phenotypes through which these diseases are
manifest, a number of prenatal genetic tests were developed by scientists and
clinicians. Initially these tests were aimed at families who had already experienced the
birth of an affected child, with conditions such as cystic fibrosis or Duchenne
Muscular Dystrophy. Tests were also developed for so-called ‘late onset’ disorders,
such as Huntington’s disease, which affect people in adulthood.
Although many have welcomed these new tests, families do not always want to take
the test or abort when the results are positive (eg in the case of cystic fibrosis – see
Lafayette et al, 1999). These tests for specific genetic disorders have not tended to
develop into more general forms of antenatal screening for a range of financial,
ethical and organisational reasons. Antenatal screening is mainly offered for more
common chromosomal disorders as Down’s Syndrome. Ultrasound anomaly scans
can also pick up a range of defects in the fetus, some of which are the result of genetic
mutations. Together prenatal genetic testing and screening or prenatal diagnosis
(PND) can be considered to be a ‘suite’ of measures which involve technological
intervention in pregnancy to diagnose genetic and chromosomal disorders in order
that prospective parents can be offered a termination should the fetus be shown to be
adversely affected.
As these technologies developed, considerable attention was devoted to the
reproductive choices associated with this new and not-so-new genetic knowledge.
Abby Lippman’s famous paper (1992) on the social and cultural constraints on
informed choice set the scene for a range of critical analyses including those from
disability studies scholars such as Tom Shakespeare (1998) which challenged the
implicit framing of disability as a medical problem to be avoided through genetic tests
and termination. Teresa Marteau (1995) and colleagues’ studies of the interpersonal
dynamics of genetic counselling, together with the impressive historical analyses of
US scholars such as Diane Paul (1998) clearly demonstrated the ways in which a
range of social and cultural conditions affect the processes through which women
come to be offered particular prenatal tests and make reproductive choices. Other
important work from an anthropological perspective, notably Rayna Rapp’s (2000)
study of amniocentesis in America, also gave a rich insight into the complex tapestry
of choices around reproduction in the clinic, the family and the community. Linking
micro-level decisions in the clinic, with larger social and cultural forces, these authors
have shown the implicit and sometimes explicit ways in which the termination of
affected fetuses is privileged over other choices, including the choice not to partake of
tests in the first place. Genetic counsellors and clinical geneticists have also reflected
upon these processes. For example, Angus Clarke in the UK (Clarke, 1991) and
2Barbara Biesecker (Biesecker and Peters, 2001) in the US, have also actively engaged
with the politics of reproductive choice and disability and sought to improve their
services to take account of the social model of disability. This has led to a number of
projects, such as the Answer (Antenatal Screening Web Resource) initiative in the
UK, co-ordinated by Shakespeare, which focus upon providing more balanced
information to prospective clients of genetic testing, and exploring experiences of
living with genetic disease for individuals and their families.1
Assisted conception technologies evolved in parallel with these prenatal genetic tests
and screening programmes, within a context of considerable public suspicion and
concern, particularly around the creation of embryos for research purposes, and the
use of these technologies by same sex couples, older or single women. Clinicians and
scientists’ early technical efforts were focused upon improving sperm selection and
embryo storage and grading, in order to increase the success rate of this complex and
difficult work. They also built an enormous market for assisted conception amongst
infertile couples, gradually extending the client base to women who were unable to
conceive for a range of medical and/or social reasons. A range of mainly US and to a
lesser extent UK scholars have explored these issues, from feminist (Steinberg, 1997;
Throsby, 2004), historical (Pfeffer, 1993) and anthropological (Franklin, 1997;
Cussins, 1996; Thompson, 2005; Konrad, 2005) perspectives in particular.
In the early days of assisted conception, little critical attention was paid to the
discarding of affected embryos – clinicians in particular saw it as obvious that couples
would only want a ‘healthy’ baby. In the early 1990s prenatal genetic diagnosis and
assisted conception met in the arena of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) (see
Roberts and Franklin, 2006). Here scientists and clinicians worked together to find
ways of selecting non-affected embryos for couples with a history of genetic disease.
These couples had often endured several rounds of PND as well as the death of their
children in infancy due to genetic disease. Although PGD has never been offered on a
wide scale and the chances of embryos implanting and pregnancies going to term
remain low – it became the focus of intense critical scrutiny in the public realm.
Meanwhile, affected families formed intense partnerships with clinicians and
scientists developing the techniques. In the UK, Roberts and Franklin’s ethnographic
study of PGD (2006) and Williams and colleagues’ interview-based studies (Williams
at al, 2007; Ehrich et al, 2006, 2007) detail the complexities of ethical discussions and
decisions that both patients and professionals have negotiated in the course of
developing and accessing these treatments. This work has demonstrated that families
and clinicians are ambivalent about embarking upon PGD and about how to handle
the information that it generates and the decisions that they must make about which
embryos to select and which to discard. In contrast to much of the work on PND, the
emphasis here has not been upon the poverty of ideal of informed choice that belies
the realities of restrictions and limits on choice, but upon the symmetries of
ambivalence for both service providers and service users, and the strange comfort
which women and their partners experience when experts acknowledge their doubts
and lack of knowledge, as they make their way through the PGD process. This
ambivalence and moral pioneering has strong echoes in the work of Rapp in
particular.
To set these developments in a wider context, it should be noted that legal, cultural
and organisational systems concerning both PND and PGD vary from country to
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PND and PGD are restricted, in others the technologies are more readily available.
The middle classes in rapidly industrialising countries such as India and China have
readily adopted these technologies and ultrasound scans are also widely available (and
used for sex selection as well as the identification of disabilities). There are also
differences across the English-speaking countries that this chapter focuses upon. In
the UK antenatal services are predominantly offered through the National Health
Service, where genetic counselling is given via clinical geneticists, and termination is
legal to term in cases of serious disability. Assisted conception services tend to be
offered through private assisted conception clinics although NHS services are
available on a limited basis. There is a well-organised regulatory system to control the
types of tests and screening services on offer through licensed clinics. Although there
are criticisms of termination and the disposal of defective embryos from pro-life and a
disability rights perspectives, abortion and assisted conception legislation is not under
threat because the majority view in parliament and public surveys is pro-choice. In
the US, the situation is more complex, with most women coming to these tests and
screening programmes through private health care in pregnancy, where screening is
more widespread and routinised. Specialist services for affected families are also
organised differently, with genetic counselling being provided by a distinct
professional group, largely drawn from a background in social psychology. The
politics of reproduction are also more complex, in the sense that abortion laws vary
according to state, and the pro-life voice is much more influential in public and in
policy processes and in limiting women’s reproductive choices in the clinic..
Querying choice
Looking across these socio-technical developments in the area of reproductive
genetics, choices are a key concern for a range of groups, not least women and their
partners. This is true for both arenas of PND and PGD. Choice is a central concern in
discussions amongst scientists, clinicians, patients, prospective parents, scholars,
critics and regulators, and even in the public understanding of genetics where
‘drawing the line’ around what reproductive choices are offered to whom has always
been a persistent metaphor and cognitive resource for thinking through the social
implications of genetics (Kerr et al, 1998). The types of choices that should be
offered, the right to choose, and the conditions which influence and restrict choices
are key to these discussions. When we turn to the growing fields of bioethics and
disability studies and their engagement with reproductive genetics, we also find a
strong emphasis upon choice, alongside a strong imagination about what choices
might become available in the future . This work often focuses upon the rights and
wrongs of termination on the grounds of less serious disorders or social
conditions/disabilities including sex (Birch, 2005; Parens and Asch, 2003). The ethics
of selection for positive traits, including ‘saviour siblings’ has also been discussed in
depth (Boyle and Savalescu, 2001). This is where a couple with an affected child uses
PGD to conceive a sibling that can be a tissue donor. The right to choose is often held
to be paramount, especially by those writing within a liberal tradition where the
individual is sacrosanct. This also extends to some arguments by disability studies
scholars, who argue that disabled people should be able to deliberately select fetuses
affected with their genetic impairments, eg deafness, although this is explicitly
condemned by some authors (see McLellan, 2002). Visions of a better ‘more equal’
world and balanced, informed even free choices around reproduction, jar with these
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difficult choices. Paradoxically, the idea of choice is at once idealised and ultimately
restricted by critics and advocates of reproductive genetics alike.
This suggests the need for further reflection on the conditions of uncertainty and
ambivalence under which reproductive genetic choices manifest and evolve. There is
the need for a more thoroughgoing analysis of how ambivalence frames and indeed
constitutes particular choices at particular times, and how choices echo through the
social world rather than evaporate at the point at which decisions are made. The open-
ended, even elusive nature of choice, for the many parties that these technologies
touch, directly and indirectly, also requires further analysis. And there is a need to
reign in dark imaginings or potentially frivolous thought experiments about choices
that might become possible in the future. We need to concentrate upon the messiness
and complexity of the present in a time of uncertainty, or else we risk losing sight of
what really matters to people in the business of reproduction. Greater empirical
precision that recognises the important differences between reproductive genetic
technologies, and the actors that engage with them would also be worthwhile.
Although there are clear parallels, the elision of PND and PGD in some of the more
broad ranging bioethical and/or disability studies discussions is especially problematic
given that the work done to constitute (and dispose of) embryos and fetuses, both
discursively and materially (within and out with the body), is so radically different in
these arenas. At the same time as we must unpack these wider dynamics and dare I
say ‘realities’ of choice, we must also move beyond a discussion of choice to consider
reproductive genetics as something more than a set of problematic choices for those
most directly affected by these technologies. Technologies have a broader cultural life
beyond the material – functioning as representations and points of cultural resonance
for particular social groups and actors. In addition to considering the public, policy
and media discourses around reproductive genetics, we must also explore what is
absent from their accounts and the ways in which they reify choice whilst failing to
confront the ambivalence through which it is mediated.
In this chapter, I will explore these themes in more depth, with the aim of unpacking
some of these complexities in the hope of contributing to and perhaps somehow
bridging academic, activist and policy discussions about these important issues. I
begin with a fuller account of choice and ambivalence, drawing on a range of
empirical studies and more theoretically oriented writings concerned with
contemporary practices in reproductive genetics. I will then move on to consider the
wider socio-cultural place of reproductive genetics, before returning to draw some
conclusions about how we understand and analyse reproductive genetics in the era of
genomics.
Introducing ambivalence
My focus here is upon sociological rather than cognitive or psychological
ambivalence (although the two are obviously not mutually exclusive).What happens
when individuals and social groups or cultural discourses hold apparently
contradictory views in parallel and are the tensions produced by these contradictions
paralysing or productive? Drawing on the ideas of Bauman (2003) and previous
collaborative work with Sarah Cunningham-Burley and Sarah Franklin (Kerr et al,
2007; Kerr and Franklin, 2006) I am interested in the extent to which ambivalence or
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genetics, for individuals and society as a whole. Bauman argues that the facilitation of
individual reflexivity alongside public spaces for citizens to challenge and debate and
disagree about the good life and how to live it is key to a new ethics that avoids the
barbarism of modernity and the nihilism of postmodernity. Although we are used to
thinking of choices as good because they can resolve ambivalence one way or
another, this is not necessarily always a good outcome, or even a genuine outcome.
Making a choice can generate other choices that can involve yet more ambivalence.
Choices may also be a burden rather than a benefit, especially when there are too
many of them. Ambivalence is therefore not necessarily something to be avoided – at
times it may be a resource or even a comfort. However, there is also a need to be
aware of where ambivalence is expressed and how it is foreclosed, avoided or
disposed of in particular discursive contexts. It is especially important to think
through the dynamics of choice and ambivalence at the level of the individuals, the
clinic, and policy as they are likely to play out differently in these various context.
Individuals may find choices burdensome and ambivalence welcome in the context of
treatment, but clinics need to offer choice and micro-manage ambivalence to enable
the service to continue, and policy needs to allow for ambivalence but also foreground
choice: a difficult circle to square.
On choice and ambivalence: frames, echoes and context
Setting aside the rather sterile debate about what has changed since the hey day of
eugenics, it seems clear that the conditions under which contemporary reproductive
genetic tests are offered to prospective clients are shot through with uncertainties and
inter-dependencies which make the notion of individual informed and/or rational
choice just that: a notion. This is captured in the following excerpt from Nikolas
Roses’ The Politics of Life Itself:
[Today’s] counselling encounters entail intense bidirectional affective
entanglements between all the parties to the encounter, and indeed generate
multiple “virtual” entanglements with parties not present – distant relatives,
absent siblings, potential offspring. In these entanglements, the ethical
relations of all the subjects to themselves and to one another are at stake,
including the experts themselves. The consultation acts as an intensifier of
ethicality. It mobilizes affects of shame and guilt, and of the respective claims,
scope and limits of freedoms for the self and obligations to others. It activates
the conflicts within the counsellors between the ethics of care and the ethics of
guidance. It requires the counsellors to fold into themselves in a way that is by
no means trivial or transient, some of the anxious and fateful undecidabilities
that possess those whom they counsel.
(Rose, 2006, 74).
Ambivalence in the sense of uncertainty and indecision is the contemporary hallmark
of reproductive genetics, at the same time as the rhetoric of informed choice marks it
as significantly different from the eugenics of the past. Counsellors and counsellees
fashion a choice from their encounters, but the complexities and ambivalence within
this process are simply not captured in the notion of ‘informed choice’. Panning back
from the clinical encounter, for people with a family history of genetic disorders, the
dilemma of procreation is not simply solved by the choices offered by PND or PGD.
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there is no inevitable momentum towards an actual encounter with them. Not only is
their provision often limited (because of a lack of specialist services or high costs),
people do not inevitably choose to take them up even when they are available. In the
case of late-onset disorders, many individuals prefer to remain in a state of ‘knowing
ignorance’ that also has implications for their reproductive behaviour. As Claudia
Downing (2005) has written in her study of families facing Huntington Disease (HD),
the same risk information can be interpreted quite differently, even by members of the
same family, and ‘negotiating responsibility’ for taking a diagnostic test and/or having
and/or passing on the disease evolves over time. For family members that choose not
to be tested in or prior to pregnancy, making it known to their families that they had
sought genetic counselling could be enough to engender their support, even if they
considered themselves unable to take the test, in some cases because ‘they needed to
retain the hope associated with uncertainty to function as responsible parents’ (231).
For others PND raises new uncertainties as the complexities of the accuracy of the
genetic information and its relationship to phenotype must be interpreted. Even with a
‘positive’ diagnosis, choosing an abortion or choosing to give birth to an affected
child does not dispose of ambivalence. The option of PGD is also far from open or
easy for many families. There are considerable costs involved – financial, emotional
and physical - and the meaning of the information provided about the embryo’s ‘risk
status’ is often far from unambiguous. Even when PGD is deemed a success and
unaffected embryos are given a ‘trajectory to life’ in the womb, that trajectory is
always open to interruption, especially since diagnosis often needs to be confirmed
through PND at a later stage in the pregnancy (Roberts and Franklin, 2006). This
means prospective parents and their care givers are often ambivalent about the value
of PGD and about how to interpret the minutiae of the information it generates.
It would be wrong, however, to consider the various risks and uncertainties associated
with PND and PGD as there to be overcome in the interests of some ideal of choice,
be that a matter of the ‘wise’ choice or the choice made wisely. Drawing on Onora
O’Neill’s discussion of trust and accountability, Roberts and Franklin contextualise
their study of PGD with a discussion of the ways in which accountability accumulates
as clients and providers work out what to do. ‘Good information’ is constituted
through open dialogue so that the meaning of that information is actively constructed
in a partnership between ‘expert’ and client (2006, 204). As Roberts and Franklin
note, ‘it is impossible to know which answers or decisions are “right” and best
practice must be based on the quality of the decision-making process which in turn
relies upon its perceived trustworthiness or accountability’ (209).This relational,
evolutionary model of accountability also makes sense in relation to choice in its own
right - in the best case scenario reproductive genetic choices unfold through critical,
open dialogue. The emphasis here is upon relational rather than individual rational
autonomy: choices are inter-subjective rather than objective and agency is co-
produced by a range of social and material actors not individuals acting alone. As
Ehrich and colleagues also note in their study of practitioners’ ethics of PGD (2007),
relational autonomy came to the fore when their participants talked through the
prospect of taking a test with affected couples and reflected upon their own values on
a more personal note. In both studies, practitioners tried to address the wider context
of reproductive choices, including their social implications. The process of addressing
these wider contexts offers a means though which to bridge ‘professional knowledge,
individual autonomy and wider social, ethical and professional values’ (8).
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between providers and their clients upon which the service is often based contrasts
rather sharply with the ‘industrial’ end of reproductive genetics: antenatal screening
for conditions such as Down’s Syndrome. Here there is precious little time for staff or
couples to critically engage with risk information, even although it is far from easy to
interpret, as both groups experience screening and subsequent diagnostic testing like a
conveyor belt that is difficult to get off (Raffle, 2001). Ideally, reproductive decision-
making should be reflexive: notions of risk and disability should evolve in exchanges
between counsellors and clients (Biesecker and Peters, 2002). However, the limited
time for screening discussions, discomfort around termination and sometimes the lack
of expertise on the part of counsellors means that underlying negative attitudes about
conditions like Down’s Syndrome are often implicitly reproduced through the
consultation (Alderson, 2001; Al-Jader, 2000). Nonetheless, there is evidence that
some practitioners are more reflexive about the limits of choice. A study by Williams
and colleagues documents practitioners’ ambivalence about the apparently inexorable
logic of progression in antenatal screening and the dangers of ‘too many choices’
(Williams et al 2002a and b). Practitioners in this study were concerned about
women’s opportunities to decline testing and feelings that they might be judged to be
irresponsible if they declined. They also expressed discomfort with their own role in
shaping clients’ decisions within a health care culture of screening and market values.
A strong critique of choice emerged in the context of this ambivalence yet these
practitioners’ ‘day job’ was to facilitate these very choices. However, studies of
peoples’ experiences of being found to have an affected pregnancy also show how a
lack of dialogue with staff exacerbated patients’ feelings of loss and grief, especially
when facing late stage terminations or perinatal death (Lalor et al, 2007; Malacrida et
al, 1999; see also Rapp, 2000). As Williams and colleagues (2001) have suggested in
a study of fetal medicine ethics, practitioners may deny engagement to protect
themselves from the emotional pain of their job. Practitioners’ lack of sensitivity to
clients stemmed, in part, from their ambivalence around death – particularly when the
imperative to ‘do something’ to avoid natural or prolonged death meant that they
actively intervened to hasten the death of the fetus in the later stages of pregnancy.
Presenting these interventions as a matter of ‘no choice’ can be helpful to some clients
as well as to staff. As Rapp notes, for some women in her study of amniocentesis, ‘the
very notion of “choice” is unbearable and must be abolished from the vocabulary of
grief’ (2000; 225) as a means of bracketing the pain of ambivalence surrounding their
decision to abort. Ambivalence is clearly expressed differently, depending upon the
context of care and the actors involved. In the case of PND, ambivalence is not used
effectively in clinical situations; practitioners and their clients do not have a means of
sharing their concerns in a way that benefits both parties. Ambivalence here is darker
and more corrosive. A focus upon choice is not a good way of managing these
difficulties either – instead it can seem to make them worse as it heightens people’s
sense of responsibility, guilt and grief.
It is also important to note that there is a distinct lack of available counselling for
people affected by the birth of a child with a genetic disorder. Parents who have
experienced the birth of a child who might have a genetic disorder do not always get
genetic counselling. Sikkens and colleagues note in a study from the Netherlands that
nearly 40% of parents who experienced the birth of a child with congenital
abnormalities and were suitable for referral to the genetic clinic did not receive
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part (Sikkens et al, 2002). There are also limits on the availability of screening and
counselling services for some ethnic groups with high prevalence of particular genetic
conditions like sickle cell (Atkins and Ahmed, 1998). This suggests that for some
their ambivalence is within a context of too few not too many choices.
Moving back from the clinic once again, reproductive choices are not made in
isolation from wider families and communities. Once made, they reverberate beyond
the individuals concerned. Even if they keep their choice a secret, clients must
consider the consequences of their choices for those around them as they may reveal
information about their risk status too. Finding out ones’ status as ‘risky subject’ can
have implications for other family members that can be especially pertinent to those
engaged in or contemplating reproduction. Mothers, sisters and daughters seem
especially bound up in these risky relations. This cannot be understood in simple
terms such as the geneticization of kinship (Finkler, 2000) as knowledge, choice and
responsibility are negotiated in complex ways. Monica Konrad has pointed to the
ways in which families affected by HD come to know and understand their kinship
through establishing and updating tentative geneaologies (2003). When new
knowledge of connections to someone at risk emerges, especially when parenthood
has commenced, this can cause profound feelings of ambivalence in the sense of
doubt and uncertainty about whether or not to contact them with this new information
and change their identity in the process.. Affected individuals also face a ‘burden’ of
deciding when to tell their children. The individual’s choice to know involves them in
considering and trying to manage the consequences of their choice for their children’s
sense of genetic and social identity. This can result in conception secrets for those
who choose non-disclosure, secrets which Konrad notes, ‘live on, even beyond their
repeated telling and retelling’ (2003, 349). Hallowell’s studies of how women with a
family history of breast cancer negotiate reproductive choice and responsibility also
show how a sense of connection with and potential guilt about one’s daughter and her
daughters to come frames treatment decisions not just reproductive decisions
(Hallowell, 1999).
Drawing on Parson’s and Atkinson’s (1992) study of the ways in which women tested
for carrier status for Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy translate their risk status into
their personal ‘stock of knowledge’ as a way of thinking about their future
reproduction, we can also imagine that some clients of reproductive genetic services
translate their experience of testing and/or termination into the everyday patterns of
their life to manage to live with the consequences of their choice. Similarly, in a study
of women’s and men’s responses to genetic risk information about breast (and in
women’s case ovarian) cancer, d’Agincourt-Canning noted,
Some participants responded to their positive results with feelings of
uncertainty. Their mutation status put them into what some have called a
‘liminal’ state that is a position of being neither ill nor perfectly well. This
state of uncertainty did not define the way they conducted their lives. Rather
than feeling threatened, these participants accepted their genetic risk as any
other risk that needed to be dealt with. While worrisome at times, it became
part of their awareness and part of their routine lives. (469-70).
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people might learn to live with genetic risks in the long term, including their previous
decisions related to reproduction that these risks had coloured. For some there will be
a process of bracketing and forgetting which enables them to live the rest of their lives
without reference to the troubles of their past. A sense of having made the right choice
and of having acted responsibly in the interests of their family and their unborn child
has been found to be important in enabling people moving on from their decision to
test and/or terminate (Rapp, 2000). At other times, a recognition of ambivalence
might actually enable people to live with the choices they have made. Garcia and
colleagues (2007) found in their study of patients’ experience of being offered PND
for Down’s Syndrome that all of the participants felt that their choices may have been
different in different contexts. This is not to say that they regretted their decisions, but
that they recognised their socially situated logic. For all of the participants, whether
they accepted or declined PND, there was considerable diversity of opinion and/or
ambivalence as they thought about what it would mean to have a disabled child in
their lives and that of their families. Perhaps this recognition of ambivalence helped
them to come to terms with the test results and the choices they made in response.
These processes of negotiating responsibility beyond the immediate choice to find out
about and manage the risk status of oneself or one’s unborn child are also part of a
wider process of identity work that genetic technologies can involve. Novas and Rose
(2000) discuss the postings to an HD support groups on the web, noting that
reproduction is a key area of concern, and suggesting that
these informal processes of mutual disclosure around such issues among those
who identify themselves with a virtual community are significant because they
constitute a new form of authority based on … experience … Within such life
strategies, the governance of risky genes is intimately tied to identity projects,
the crafting of healthy bodies, and the management of our relations with others
(503).
Prospective and previous reproductive choices thus form part of people’s
constructions of identity, in environments where they can share their experiences with
similar others. This does not only apply to the virtual realm, but to more grounded
communities in a range of contexts, from condition-based support groups to parenting
networks. Revealing and hiding reproductive choices and disease status are also part
of how people account for their identity amongst colleagues, friends and in their
engagements with service providers with an interest in their health. This can involve
opening up, sharing and/or managing ambivalence and helping people to make or
avoid particular choices about what to know.
To sum up, informed choice is an ideal not met in practice in the sphere of
reproductive genetics. Sometimes this is because patients do not have access to
diverse and nuanced information and appropriate space for contemplation and
decision-making. At other times, there is a lack of opportunity, desire or motivation to
make a choice, or even a lack of ability to face choices or to live with their
consequences. However, choices still get made - sometimes this is experienced as a
resolution, at other times there is regret and guilt, for clients and practitioners alike.
But a condition of ambivalence can also prevail in a more positive sense - seeing that
the possibility that other choices could have been made can be comforting rather than
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distressing for affected individuals. Practitioners too can experience offering and
facilitating patients’ reproductive choices as giving them the best chance of a healthy
baby, or as a form of closure when faced with abnormality or a source of more
difficulty and uncertainty for their patients and their own moral selves. Sometimes
there are too few choices and sometimes there are too many. Choices are variously
revealed and hidden as people construct their identities in various contexts. Choices
and lack of choice have the potential to create and/or mitigate ambivalence in
complex ways.
Individuals, families and clinics’ engagement with PND and PGD are characterised
by a lexicon of choice and ambivalence that the ideal of informed, or individual
choice does not capture. Ambivalence here can mean uncertainty, indecision and
dilemma, but also knowing ignorance and the conditions of hope for the future.
Choices in these contexts are highly variable and context specific, based on relational
rather than individual autonomy. They cannot be understood in isolation from
ambivalence. It seems that the people who are closest to these processes know this
most acutely, be they affected individuals or practitioners. Yet these conditions of
ambivalence seem to get lost on the wider public stage where reproductive genetics is
invariably reduced to a matter individual choice.
The sociocultural places of reproductive genetics
This focus upon individual choice means that the choices which are made in the
process of facilitating the testing or screening service overall get lost from view
(Lippman, 1992). These are choices which pregnant women and families affected by
genetic disease do not traditionally play a role in. Yet there is no intrinsic logic to any
technology, despite how we sometimes feel as recipients and practitioners. Instead,
technologies and their applications are socially accomplished through a combination
of material and human agency, as much of the work in the sociology of technology
has amply demonstrated. In the area of reproductive genetics it seems that a limited
range of actors participate in these processes and operate with a narrow, often
economistic version of the public health in mind (Kerr, 2004, chapter 4).
However, the recent opening up of genetic and embryo research and assisted
conception to wider public scrutiny has created some spaces for affected women and
their families to become more involved in shaping the agenda of diagnostic and
treatment facilities and public policy more widely (see Rabeharisoa and Callon,
2004). In the UK this is especially true in the smaller more ‘craft’ based areas like
PGD where a range of public consultation events have taken place and have shaped
the regulation of this technology. Patients groups have become increasingly effective
at putting their agenda for better diagnostic and treatment services across, including
the case for stem cell research. Families with genetic disorders, especially those who
have experienced the death of a child in infancy, can expose their private reproductive
ambivalence in public as a means of demanding greater reproductive choice. Parents’
key role in establishing a demand for PGD is often highlighted by clinicians in this
field, and the model of partnership is also stressed by other pioneers of antenatal
diagnostic testing for conditions such as cystic fibrosis. However, the more radical or
questioning agendas of some of the disability rights organisations who are also part of
these consultations is less influential. Their calls for investments in service provision
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over ‘cure,’ and their accounts of how it feels to confront a test that is designed to
make sure that people like them are not born, have not had much of an impact on
reproductive genetics beyond the general level of public debate. Their concerns are
expressed and then bracketed by regulators, parents and innovators alike, in other
words their ambivalence is managed away. The rhetoric of individual choice has more
institutional leverage and support from diverse groups with a stake in reproductive
genetics.
Choice also looms large in the wider public’s ethical discourses around PGD, but in a
way that is intimately tied to ambivalence. Scully and colleague’s (2006) study of lay
views on sex selection using PGD noted a high degree of ambivalence about choice
because of the perception that it placed a burden on people, especially in conditions of
uncertainty about knowledge, a tendency to individualise responsibility for health and
negative value judgements about disability. Ideals of good parenting and the personal
liberty of the child profoundly shaped these accounts, in a model of relational
autonomy, as with the case of professionals involved with the provision of PGD as
reported above. Although necessarily situated within a strong discourse of
ambivalence, choice was nonetheless a key organising concept for how participants
thought about the morality of PGD being used for social rather than more obviously
medical reasons in Scully and colleagues’ study. Interestingly, there was also a strong
theme of the need to relinquish choice as a part of parenthood, to deal with the
reproductive dice as they are thrown and to accept children, however they turn out.
Participants found it difficult to establish where these choices ought to begin and end
in relation to the spectrum of disorders that the tests might be used to identify, as have
others in similar studies of genetic testing as a whole (Kerr et al, 1998b), but the need
to make a choice was paramount. In a focus group study on reproductive genetics in
the US, Kalfoglou and colleagues (2005) also found an interesting diversity in
participants’ notions of choice, including appeals to the importance of accepting
God’s choice and a despair about people’s capacities to make wise choices, born of a
general scepticism about humanity. As they noted, ‘These participants were
concerned that greed, vanity, and prejudice would drive both individual and policy
choices’ (1617). Yet, in common with other studies, the authors found that the
majority of participants bracketed this ambivalence in favour of individual choice,
based on a sense that couples directly affected by these conditions should make their
own decisions.
We must also remember that there are some important cultural differences in how
reproductive choices are related to perceptions of good motherhood in particular. The
UK-US ambivalence around choice is often resolved, for regulators and a majority of
publics alike, in the right of couples to choose but this carries with it a profound
ambivalence about whether or not these couples are acting like good parents in trying
to choose ‘healthy’ children. We can see such ambivalence on global as well as local
stages. In countries with a more barbaric history of state-sponsored eugenics,
Germany in particular, women can be shamed if they take up reproductive genetics
because it is seen as selfish, whereas in other societies where reproductive genetics
has been embraced, notably Israel, it might be considered selfish not to take the test
(Hashiloni-Dolev and Shkedi, 2007). Both extremes in their different ways, constitute
a model of motherhood in terms of relational autonomy - German and Israeli mothers
are expected to limit their autonomy in the interests of the child. At the same time, it
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is reproductive choice (or lack thereof) that becomes the focal point of social
judgement.
Key actors in policy discussions about reproductive genetics also foreground choice
in conditions of ambivalence. As Mittra (2007) has argued, the recent report by the
UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, entitled Human
Reproductive Technologies and the Law (HOC, 2005) used reproductive autonomy as
a battering ram against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority’s previous
decisions to limit PGD to serious disorders by emphasising the precautionary
principle (although the HFEA have also been criticised for their wide interpretation of
‘serious’ in making licensing decisions). The committee emphasised the need to
devolve decision-making to clinicians and clients, except in cases where evidence of
harm to individuals or society was compelling. Considerable attention was devoted to
drawing a distinction between the eugenics of the past, with an emphasis upon
coercive population improvement, and individual choices to improve health and avoid
disease and disability in the present: discourses promoted by an unlikely alliance of
pro-technology, pro-medicine and pro-choice activists. These arguments sit alongside,
but not necessarily in dialogue with, anti-abortion and disability-activists’
problematisation of individualism, information and choice and their concerns about
the consequences of negative representations of disability, as perpetuated by antenatal
testing and screening, for people living with disabilities (see Kerr and Shakespeare,
2002). The more recent UK Human Genetics Commission report entitled Making
Babies: Reproductive Decisions and Genetic Technologies (2006) attempted to bridge
this divide by privileging reproductive autonomy at the same time as promoting better
service provision for people with disabilities to enable couples to ‘make a real choice
to have a child with a genetic condition if that is what they so wish’ (11). The HGC
also recognised a relational dimension to reproductive autonomy and accepted that
reproductive decisions are made in context and may have effects beyond the couple
and their potential child, including society as a whole. Yet the HGC defaulted to
reproductive autonomy as a means of resolving these tensions, whilst also stressing
other vaguer notions of ‘genetic solidarity’ and protecting children’s interests
alongside the principle of individual choice. It seems the best that can be done is to
line up a set of principles, with choice top of the list, without tackling the ways in
which these principles entwine and contradict each other. The appeal to ‘real choices’
emphasises choice once again, in such a way that it dominates when cast alongside
much more tentative appeals to precaution and the need to think about ‘drawing the
line’ at selection of trivial traits such as myopia.
Individual choice dominates in a range of public discussion and pronouncements
about reproductive genetics. Although ambivalence is often recognised and expressed
individual choice is a kind of default position for regulatory bodies, members of the
public and even patient advocates. An important reason for the dominance of choice
in these various public discourses around reproductive genetics is the backdrop of
anti-abortion and anti-embryo research politics against which they play out. Although
in the UK these are the views of a vocal minority, it is a minority that nevertheless
plays an active role in public discussion and debate about reproductive genetics,
presenting a range of legal and moral challenges to regulators and parents alike (see
Mulkay, 1992). These groups seek to close off ambivalence around the ‘meaning of
life’ by arguing against a gradualist, transitional model where the potential for life
grows rather than is established at the moment of conception. At the same time they
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seek to open up ambivalence on other fronts, around the extent to which women are
being offered ‘real choices’ and about the values we place on disabled lives. Scientists
and pro-research advocates have tended to mobilise choice to counteract these claims,
but also to open up ambivalence of their own about what the moment of conception
might be, for example.
These strategic aspects of ambivalence should not be underestimated when
considering the politics of reproductive choice writ large. However, there is little
critical reflection of their role in debate in mainstream press coverage of reproductive
genetics, where we repeatedly see reproductive genetics presented as a debate
between ‘pro-life’ versus ‘pro-science’ positions. The focus upon particular events
such as new discoveries and applications also feeds this dichotomous format. From
press reporting around cloning and stem cell research, to genomics more broadly,
there is a consistent lack of attention to the realities of women’s choices and the
complexities of risk information and interpretation with which they must engage
(Williams et al, 2003; Petersen, 2002; Nerlich et al, 2003; Kitzinger et al, 2002).
Although fictional representations and dramas about reproduction and genetics tend to
explore ambivalence in more depth, these cultural products often sensationalise by
foregrounding ‘sex and death’ (Henderson et al date). The ironic play of particular
frames around reproductive genetics in the press also needs to be recognised. Just as
readers do not believe all that they read, journalists do not believe all that they write
(Petersen, 2002). However, there is still a tendency to focus upon imagined futures of
prospective treatments and cure, a tendency that potentially undermines wider and
deeper discussion of the one key area where genetics has had an impact upon clinical
practice: the area of reproduction.
Conclusion
We understand now that uncertainty is not a temporary nuisance, which can be
chased away through learning the rules, or surrendering to expert advice, or
just doing what others do. Instead it is a permanent condition of life. We may
say more – it is the very soil in which the moral self takes root and grows….
[We must recognise] the intimate connection (not contradiction!) between
autonomous, morally self-sustained and self-governed (often therefore
unwieldy and awkward) citizens and a fully-fledged, self-reflective and self-
correcting political community. They can only come together; neither is
thinkable without the other. (Bauman, 2003, 36)
Bauman argues that there ought to be a process of translating between productive and
positive situations of personal ambivalence and public spaces where ambivalence can
be freely expressed. This could, in his view, form the basis for a better kind of private
and public existence in late modernity. This is an intriguing possibility. Given the
conditions of ambivalence that we can trace in the area of reproductive genetics,
especially in affected couple’s, publics and professionals’ responses to testing and
screening more generally, is there any possibility for drawing upon them to improve
dialogue and policy making in this contested realm?
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Perhaps it is time to dismantle the ideal of informed choice in reproductive genetics
and to put a more modest and provisional version of choice in its place that works
with rather than against conditions of ambivalence. Drawing from Roberts and
Franklin, it seems that the best types of decisions are made in the context of
meaningful relationships between experts - affected families, embryologists,
clinicians and counsellors – where ambivalence is openly acknowledged. An
exploration of ambivalence clearly requires time. This underlines the importance of
timely service provision and space for reflection with supportive counselling for
affected couples. This is not an argument about reducing choices in the interests of
the community rather than the individual. Rather it is a call to mode beyond the ideal
of choice as a matter for individuals alone through supportive dialogue rather than
condemnation or restriction. More generally, there needs to be time for policy makers
and service providers to attend to the sociotechnical contexts through which tests and
screening services evolve and the choices and ambivalence therein and a wider range
of people need to be involved in these processes.
There is also a need for more creative thinking around choice in the public and
political spheres. Too often, it seems, we shy away from allowing people their choices
for fear of infringing their freedoms, at the same time as we leave them alone with
their responsibility to choose. We need more widespread recognition of the ways
reproductive choices are framed and limited, and how they are not necessarily always
welcome or comforting for those who must make them. We also need better support
and empathy for people making reproductive choices - resisting the urge to stand in
judgement while loudly proclaiming ‘it’s up to you’. The typical policy move of
resolving tensions around reproductive genetics by appealing to individual choice is
far from satisfactory. Perhaps other values like compassion and goodness could take
its place. It certainly seems that policy maker, activists, affected families, practitioners
and professionals as well as scholars and writer could benefit from actively seek to
talk beyond and around choice. This draws upon the sophisticated understanding of
reproduction and disability that many groups of the public have already, media
rhetoric notwithstanding. The lived realities of having and raising children, caring for
sick and elderly relatives, and negotiating responsibilities for oneself and ones’ family
are intrinsic parts of what we all do, whether we are touched by genetic disease or not.
If our political community is to build upon this lay understanding, as well as the many
rich and varied studies we have of people’s direct experiences of reproductive genetic
choices and responsibilities, we need to protect and even foster a range of unwieldy
and awkward scholars and citizens of genomics. Challenging ambivalence is as
important as fostering it.
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